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Abstract 
Varga (2012) argues that the sense of reality disrupted in various psychopathologies, including 
derealization (DR) and depersonalization (DP), is pre-intentional (or in some sense, the product of a more 
basic, operative intentionality that is pre-predicative). This moves us away from the more dominant 
conceptions of delusion and the loss of sense of reality as problems best explained in terms of 
propositional attitudes, like beliefs, or framework propositions (see, e.g., Campbell 2001; Eilan 2000). 
Furthermore, Varga suggests a certain triadic structure in which DR/DP affects not just the sense of 
reality, but also the sense of self and our intersubjective relations with others. Reality, self, and others are 
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Varga (2012) argues that the sense of re-ality disrupted in various psychopatholo-gies, including derealization (DR) and 
depersonalization (DP), is pre-intentional (or in 
some sense, the product of a more basic, opera-
tive intentionality that is pre-predicative). This 
moves us away from the more dominant concep-
tions of delusion and the loss of sense of reality as 
problems best explained in terms of propositional 
attitudes, like beliefs, or framework propositions 
(see, e.g., Campbell 2001; Eilan 2000). Further-
more, Varga suggests a certain triadic structure in 
which DR/DP affects not just the sense of reality, 
but also the sense of self and our intersubjective 
relations with others. Reality, self, and others are 
tied together into a system where psychotic dis-
ruptions reverberate across all these dimensions.
Varga insightfully appeals to Husserl’s phenom-
enological conception of transcendental or open 
intersubjectivity as a way to show how our rela-
tions with others enter into the co-constitution of 
reality. One can also appeal to empirical studies to 
point in this same direction. I would like to pursue 
this idea, briefly, in the spirit of Merleau-Ponty’s 
question: “Now if the transcendental is intersub-
jectivity, how can the borders of the transcendental 
and the empirical help becoming indistinct?” And 
his rather dramatically expressed response: “All 
of my facticity is reintegrated into subjectivity …. 
Thus the transcendental descends into history” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1967, 107). It makes perfect sense 
to think that whatever one determines to be the 
case on transcendental grounds, must also be re-
flected, if not cashed out, in empirical terms open 
to scientific investigation (see Gallagher 2011).1
The empirical studies that I have in mind are 
primarily developmental ones concerning joint 
attention and secondary intersubjectivity (Trev-
arthen 1998; Trevarthen and Hubley 1978), and 
studies that support the enactive approach to 
cognition (e.g., Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 
1991). It is clear from the developmental stud-
ies that starting even before 9 months of age 
infants, who arguably have no concept of belief, 
who are pre-linguistic in the standard sense, but 
who relate to others primarily through embodied 
(sensory–motor) interactions, begin to gain a 
basic, pragmatic sense of what counts as real, 
significant, and salient, only by attending with 
others to those environmental objects and states 
of affairs that those others attend to with inter-
est. The meaningful world is carved out of the 
physical environment in just those practices and 
interactions with others that constitute secondary 
intersubjectivity (the empirical counterpart to 
Husserl’s open intersubjectivity). These intersub-
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jective practices include not only joint attention, 
but those abilities that infants have for grasping 
the context-determined intentions of others, and 
for participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and 
Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher 2009).
Participatory sense-making involves making 
sense of the world, a co-constitution of mean-
ing, through active engagement and coordinated 
interaction with others. This may take place in 
play situations as well as in work situations; it is 
basic to action and perception. On the enactive 
view, we see the world as meaningful in terms of 
what we can do with things, what we can reach 
or not reach, what presents as affordances or 
disaffordances. Gibson’s notion of affordances is 
ecological, which means it points to the fact that 
affordances are defined in terms of what we are 
capable of doing as embodied agents, and what the 
environment offers. That is, it involves both self 
and world in their coupled and dynamic relations. 
This ecological mix, however, necessarily includes 
others, because we surely learn what things mean, 
how to handle things, how to deal with things, 
and how to value things from the actions of others 
and our own interactions with them. The sense 
of reality, then, is generated in this, at once, pre-
predicative, pragmatic, and social milieu.
Importantly, what we see in studies of joint 
attention, secondary intersubjectivity, and partici-
patory sense-making pertains not just to infants. 
It continues to characterize our interactions with 
others and our action-oriented stance toward re-
ality throughout our lifetime, on both pragmatic 
and emotional levels. For example, in studies of 
object evaluation in adults, the gaze of the other 
person toward an object can draw one’s atten-
tion to the object. Subjects presented with a face 
looking toward (or away from) an object evaluate 
the object as more (or less) likeable than those 
objects that don’t receive much attention from 
others. When you add an emotional expression 
to the face, the effect is stronger (Bayliss et al. 
2006; 2007). In addition, the quality of the other 
person’s movement is important. Seeing another 
person act with ease (or without ease) toward an 
object will influence one’s feelings about the object 
(Hayes et al. 2007). Indeed, my awareness of the 
gaze of others toward objects or in joint attention 
influences my perception of objects in regard to 
motor action, significance, and emotional salience; 
the other’s regard will have an effect on the way 
I may come to feel about that object, and it may 
lead to subsequent action (Becchio, Bertone, and 
Castiello 2008; Becchio et al. 2007). Our sense 
of what counts as real and what’s significant is 
firmly rooted in this pervasive pragmatic and social 
frame of reference, which operates as a ‘massive 
hermeneutical background’ (Bruner and Kalmar 
1998; Gallagher, in press) for our dealings with 
the world and with others.
“Firmly rooted,” relatively stable, perhaps even 
transcendental, as Varga suggests, but not unas-
sailable or guaranteed, as psychopathology shows. 
Varga is right to suggest that purely cognitive ac-
counts of breakdowns like DP and DR in terms 
of predicative judgments, beliefs, or propositional 
attitudes are inadequate; likewise, purely cognitive 
accounts in these terms (and we can add, in terms 
of theory of mind) of the generation of this triadic 
coupling—self, world, others—are impoverished, 
if not distorted, insofar as they ignore the embod-
ied and enactive processes at their root.
Note
1. I note that Husserl makes the same point: “every 
analysis or theory of transcendental phenomenology, 
including the transcendental theory of the constitution 
of an objective world – can be produced in the natural 
realm, when we give up the transcendental attitude” 
(1970 §57).
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